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Abstract: The problem of interpretation of war between the Tang Empire and Bohai in period 732-735. Bohai 
kingdom (698 - 926) was the first state in the history of the Russian Far East. This article considers the most 
discussed period of the history of Bohai – its war against Chinese Empire Tang. This military conflict changed the 
political situation not only on the Korean Peninsula, but in East Asia in general. This war also influenced political 
contacts in the Far East significantly. On the basis of different materials and studies of events in the neighboring 
states and tribes, the authors have analyzed events leading up to the war, the military operations in the war itself and 
the results of this conflict. 
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A short discussion of Bohai’s history up until 
735 
To start with, we must consider the history of 
Bohai up until 735 in order to understand the 
specifics of the issue at hand. 
The state of Bohai1 (in Russian: Бохай, in 
Korean: Parhae 발해, in Chinese: Bohai ??, in 
Japanese- Bokkai) existed in what is now the 
Russian Maritime Region (Primorskij krai/ 
Приморский край), as well as including territories 
that are parts of modern-day North Korea and 
Northeastern China. It existed from the late 
seventh to the early tenth centuries AD.* (A. P. 
Okladnikov, 1959; A. P. Okladnikov, A. P. 
Derevianko, 1973). According to the Japanese 
annals “Ruiju-kokushi” (??国?), the Bohai 
state was founded in 698 AD. A number of events 
had led to the formation of this state. Leading up to 
the emergence of Bohai, the Korean kingdom 
Koguryŏ had been destroyed in 668 by the Tang 
Empire and Silla (another Korean state), and parts 
of the Mohe tribes, who were vassals of Koguryŏ, 
switched their loyalties to the Tang Empire or mi- 
grated elsewhere. 
However there were also Mohe groups that 
resisted pressure from Tang China and with people 
from Koguryo carefully prepared a rebellion. 
Short-sighted political decisions (oppressions of 
nomadic tribes) by leaders of Tang China in the 
east also provoked a rebellion by the Khitan tribes 
in 696, and the Mohe along with Koguryŏ groups 
used this episode as a pretext to establish the new 
state of Zhen (in Korean: Jin, 진). The ruler of this 
state was Da Zuorong (大??, in Korean reading 
- Dae Jo Yeong, 대조영). The Tang Empire sought 
assistance from the Turks. Turkic cavalry 
subsequently defeated the rebel Khitan army. After 
this, the Tang Empire sent a retaliatory expedition 
to deal with Da Zuorong, but this army was 
destroyed.  
Da Zuorong established relations with the 
Second Turkic Kahagnate and Silla and in 700 he 
received ranks from them (for example, the fifth 
rang “Dae Achan” from Silla). In 705 the Tang 
emperor fundamentally changed his attitude 
toward Bohai. Accordingly, China sent an 
ambassador to Bohai whose task was to establish 
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peaceful relations. In response Da Zuorong sent his 
second son, Da Menyi (in Korean reading - Dae 
Mun-ye, 대문예), as a hostage to the Tang 
Empire**. In 713 Da Zuorong received Tang 
recognition as the ruler of a new state called Bohai. 
From this date on references to Bohai in the 
Chinese annals can be found. As a result of the 
ambassadorial group’s exchanges between the 
Tang Empire and Bohai, Da Zuorong received the 
new title “Bohaigunwang” of the sovereign of 
Bohai. On one hand, it meant a guarantee of 
peaceful co-existence with China, but it also 
resulted in antagonistic relations with Silla. The 
situation changed after death of Da Zuorong. From 
719 the second Bohai ruler Da Wuyi (大??, 
Korean reading – Dae Mu-ye, 대무예), began to 
look for allies to fight against the Tang Empire. 
For example, he developed relations with the 
Khitan and Turkic tribes, as well as with Japan, 
aspiring to receive their support against the 
Chinese Empire. 
His young brother, Da Menyi criticized his 
position and considered his diplomatic activities to 
be a potential cause of Bohai’s destruction in the 
future. Moreover, Da Menyi was commander of 
the Bohai army, but nonetheless criticized the 
commands of his superior the Bohai ruler. Hence, 
Da Wuyi wanted to kill his younger brother, but 
Da Menyi was tipped off about the plot and with a 
small group of people fled to China. 
In 732 Bohai started a war against China with 
military operations that began at sea – the Bohai 
navy attacked the Shandong peninsula and 
destroyed the biggest seaport of the Tang Empire 
in the east – Dengzhou (D. Twitchett 1979; A. L. 
Ivliev, 2005). Bohai’s army also assisted the 
Khitans, who were fighting with China. In this 
difficult situation, the Tang Empire along with 
Silla built an alliance consisting of several tribes. 
In so doing they formed an army group that could 
march against Bohai. In the war between the Tang 
Empire and Bohai in 732 - 735, Silla assisted 
China, describing in official letters Bohai as 
“rebellious barbarians” (Nan Hee Ku, 2011, p. 
396) and improved relations with Chinese Empire. 
Tang asked Silla for military support, and Silla 
prepared an army (100 thousands strong) (Nan Hee 
Ku, 2011, p. 396) by land to enable an “attack 
from both flanks” with the soldiers of the Tang 
Empire, who were to attack Bohai in the north. 
However snow and rough mountain roads made 
the plan impossible to carry out; the Silla army lost 
half its soldiers and returned to south (Kuk Jeong 
Jang, 2001, p. 169; Samguksagi 1959). In spite of 
the failure of Silla’s expedition, the attempt 
influenced the outcome of the war between Tang 
and Bohai. Silla showed that it could potentially 
help China, and Bohai must have noted the 
possibility of an attack from its southern border. 
Bohai was forced to move some of its military to 
defend its southern flank from Silla. While Silla 
initially attacked unsuccessfully, the pressure from 
two fronts finally resulted in Bohai suing for peace 
with China in 733 (A. L. Ivliev, 2005). 
The historiography of the war. 
As mentioned above, Bohai was located in 
areas of the modern states North Korea, China and 
Russia. Scholars from these countries have 
considered the question of the war between Bohai 
and Tang Empire very differently.  
For example, Chinese historians believe that 
Bohai was a provincial power in medieval China 
(Hong Song, 2001) and do not consider this 
conflict to have occurred between independent 
states.  
North Korean specialists think that the Tang 
Empire provoked the war with Bohai – an 
independent kingdom. In their opinion, Bohai 
commenced military hostilities as a preventive 
action because China would attack Bohai in any 
case (Guk Jeong Jang, 2001). They have 
considered events of the war in detail (Guk Jeong 
Jang, 2001). They describe the war as being 
successful for Bohai, and do not write about results 
of the conflict (Bohai’s ambassadorial mission 
arrived in China to ask for peace and mercy, a fact 
overlooked in the North Korean narrative).  
South Korean scholars have been active in 
researching the war, but are not united in how they 
explain the origins of the war. Some historians 
consider the conflict to be connected with Bohai’s 
relations with Silla (this medieval Korean state, 
located in the central and south parts of the Korean 
peninsula, had antagonistic relations with Bohai) 
(A. A. Kim, 2011a), other specialists do not 
comment on the reasons and results of the war** 
(Giu Cheol Han, 1994; Ki Ho Song, 1995; A. A. 
Kim, 2011b. 
The position of Russian historians is rather 
different. Scholars in the Soviet Union considered 
Bohai to be an independent kingdom without 
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Chinese political or cultural influence. Therefore 
they portrayed Bohai as a state that had 
successfully resisted China; these scholars were 
therefore not all that interested in results of the war 
itself (A. P. Okladnikov, 1959; A. P. Okladnikov, 
A. P.  Derevinako, 1973). 
However, in the post-Soviet period, 
historians’ views of this war have changed. 
Certainly, some Russian historians continue to 
support Soviet views of the war between Bohai and 
China, but other specialists have written that Bohai 
could not successfully fight against Tang Empire 
for such a long time (A. L. Ivliev, 2005). 
Who started the war and why. 
The war cannot be considered to be a 
preventive attack by Bohai against Tang Empire 
(as is commonly thought). China had not prepared 
its ground or naval forces for military activity 
against Bohai. This is the reason why Bohai’s first 
attacks were successful. Clearly, the Tang Empire 
had a large numerical and resource advantage over 
Bohai. Certainly, China did not anticipate a Bohai 
attack in 732; therefore we must look for other 
reasons as to why Bohai attacked the Tang Empire.  
First, Bohai wanted to help the Khitans. As is 
known, in the period 715 - 730 the Khitans 
recognized Tang Empire as suzerain. However in 
730 the new Khitan chief began to support 
positions by Turkic Khaganate. At that time Turks 
had antagonistic relations with the Tang Empire. 
Therefore China sent an army and defeated Khitan 
and Xsi (allies of the Khitan) troops in 731 - 732. 
After this battle Bohai forces suddenly attacked the 
Tang Empire. The Khitan army supported Bohai in 
this war. So, it seems clear that China did not 
provoke the Bohai attack – rather the attack was in 
support of Bohai’s allies – i.e. the Khitan tribes. 
Khitan lands were located between Bohai and the 
Tang Empire. Clearly, Bohai’s rulers considered 
the Khitan tribes to be a buffer against China. As 
mentioned above, the second Bohai ruler had 
problems with his younger brother who fled to the 
Tang Empire and Da Wuyi considered this 
situation to be dangerous for his powerbase. The 
Tang Empire could destroy Bohai’s buffer and 
therefore the Bohai ruler began a war with China. 
As is known, Bohai began this war and the 
first attack was aimed at Dengzhou. The Chinese 
annals “Xin Tang shu” (?唐?, The New history 
of Tang) and “Jiu Tang shu” (舊唐?, The Old 
history of Tang), which are the main sources of 
information we have about the war of 732 - 735, 
only briefly mention attacks by the Bohai navy on 
this Chinese seaport.  In the Chinese annals only 
Bohai’s attack on Dengzhou and the killing of the 
governor of this big seaport is discussed, damage 
to the city by the Bohai navy is completely absent 
from the narrative. However, on the basis of these 
materials we can analyze the reasons for and the 
results of Bohai’s attack on the seaport of 
Dengzhou. 
The materials provide information only about 
land operations during the war.   
However, according “Xin Tang shu”, in the 
war against Khitans at 696 - 697 (this war gave 
allowed for formation of the Bohai state) the Tang 
Empire used naval power very effectively. For 
example, China moved 50 thousands soldiers by 
sea to the rear of the Khitan army (A. A. Kim, 
2011b). It was an important factor in China’s 
victory in this war. So, it is clear that the Tang 
Empire had a large number of military vessels. 
But the Tang Empire did not use this fleet for 
similar military operations against Bohai in 732 - 
733. It is not clear why Tang did not make use of 
its substantial naval forces. However, clearly, if the 
Tang Empire had used its navy against Bohai in 
the war 732 - 735 Chinese annalists would have 
written about it. Because no such references are 
present in the records, it seems clear that Chinese 
naval power was not involved in the war. 
As is known, the Tang Empire did not 
undertake any naval operations in the period 700 - 
732. I believe that the Chinese fleet could not be 
destroyed by the navies of neighboring states, like 
Japan or Silla. This is because of two reasons; first, 
these states did not have comparably large navies, 
and second, if Japanese or Silla navies destroyed 
Chinese military fleet, medieval Korean and 
Japanese annalists would surely have written in 
their annals about a big victory at sea. So, it is 
therefore plausible that the Bohai fleet destroyed 
Chinese navy in Dengzhou.  
In opinion of the author, the military fleet of 
the Tang Empire was located in Dengzhou for 
different reasons. Initially, China had hostile 
relations with Silla. Between Silla and the Tang 
Empire were located the lands of a large number of 
different nomadic tribes (like the Xsi, Khitans and 
others), as well as the territory of Bohai. Therefore 
China and Silla could not engage in a land war 
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between each other (moreover, initially Silla used 
Bohai as a buffer against potential Tang 
aggression), but they very easily could have 
utilized the sea as a field for war. Clearly, the Tang 
Empire noted this possibility.  
Second, China had problems with the Khitans. 
These nomadic tribes did not have a fleet, and 
therefore the Tang Empire could move its army by 
sea to the rear of Khitan territory, like in the war in 
the 696 - 697.  
Third, China concentrated military ships near 
the Shandong peninsula to deal with pirates, who 
sometimes attacked Chinese trade or diplomatic 
missions.  
Clearly, Da Wuyi knew about importance of 
the seaport Dengzhou (it was biggest port in 
Shandong Peninsula) for China as a base for the 
imperial fleet and considered the possibility of an 
attack by Tang Empire from the sea. The Chinese 
fleet could be very effective against a Bohai army 
and could become a problem for the concentration 
of Bohai military troops, because they would be 
forced to potentially defend their own sea ports 
from attacks by the Tang Empire. 
But to attack Dengzhou, the Bohai ruler 
clearly had new information about the system of 
defenses of this seaport, as well as the number and 
positions of Chinese ships. In the first year of the 
war Bohai destroyed Dengzhou very quickly; the 
Chinese army did not have time to bring in forces 
to support this seaport. Bohai’s success confirmed 
that its navy had new information about the 
position of the Chinese imperial fleet and the 
situation in the seaport. Therefore one can surmise 
that Bohai utilized ambassadorial missions, 
hostages in the imperial court of the Tang Empire 
and trade groups to obtain such information.  
However, Bohai ambassadorial groups and 
hostages were not important sources for 
information about Dengzhou. Clearly, diplomatic 
missions were present in Dengzhou after their 
arrival from Bohai, but they stayed in the seaport 
for only a short time and before proceeding to the 
Chinese Capital. Moreover, officers of the Tang 
Empire paid attention to members of the 
ambassadorial group, groups were limited in the 
reconnaissance and espionage activities they could 
undertake. Hostages located at the Chinese 
Imperial court and could not collect new 
information about the Chinese fleet. Moreover, 
they served as officers of the Tang imperial guard 
and cannot come to the sea coast.  
Therefore it seems that Bohai used trade 
missions to obtain new information about the fleet 
of the Tang Empire. Clearly, Bohai sent a large 
number of trade ships to China and officers in 
Dengzhou could not watch all members of these 
trade missions. They arrived in China with 
ambassadorial groups, but when Bohai diplomats 
came to the capital of the Tang Empire, merchants 
stayed in Dengzhou or near of this seaport. The 
trade missions could come back to Bohai at any 
time and gave important information to 
commanders of the Bohai navy. 
As is known, Da Wuyi used the Bohai fleet 
and pirates ships in the attack of Dengzhou 
(Samguksagi 1959: 219; Ki Ho Song, 1995, p. 69; 
Dyuk Gong Yu 2000, p. 53-54; **Parhaesa 1996, p. 
33). Therefore, it seems likely that the Bohai ruler 
had estimates about the size of the Chinese navy, 
understood that his forces were not sufficient for a 
successful attack and asked pirates for help. 
Clearly, pirates supported the Bohai navy because 
they considered the Tang fleet a major impediment 
to their activities. Furthermore, pirates alone could 
not have beaten the Chinese fleet, but with the 
combined power of pirates and the Bohai navy 
they were successful in destroying the Tang 
Empire’s naval base.  
It appears that the Bohai attack on Dengzhou 
destroyed the main Chinese navy. The reasons for 
such a view will be discussed below.  
In opinion of the authors, the second Bohai 
ruler considered different strategies for war and 
understood that he could not fight against both the 
combined against China and forces of Tang’s army 
and fleet. Da Wuyi had time for this from 727 and 
could analyze situation. Clearly, Bohai did not 
have large number of the military ships and could 
not fight against a Tang fleet for prolonged periods. 
Moreover, the Bohai people did not have a good 
understanding of Chinese geography or where its 
many seaports were located.  
Conversely, on land, the Bohai army was in a 
very comfortable position. As is known, the major 
part of the army of the Tang Empire was infantry. 
Clearly, the raw number of Chinese soldiers was 
vast. However, most part of the Bohai army 
consisted of the Mohe warriors. Mohe troops were 
archer cavalry. Cavalry had good conditions for  
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fighting in Manchuria. In spite of the fact that 
China had experience of fighting against nomadic 
tribes (like, Khitan, Turks and other) for a long 
time, the Tang Empire could not adapt to Bohai 
tactics. Moreover, the armies of the Bohai’s allies- 
namely, Khitan tribes - were also archer cavalry. 
Therefore the Bohai and Khitan armies effectively 
fought against the Chinese army and were stopped 
only near Madoushan Mountain (near line of the 
Great Chinese Walls). Chinese forces were forced 
to resorting to blocking the roads with large rocks 
(A. L. Ivliev, 2005). Clearly, generals of the army 
of the Tang Empire used this strategy in order to 
limit the activities of the Bohai forces.  
Moreover, we noted that in the “Xin tang shu” 
we can see that 5000 Shiwei and Mohe riders 
arrived to Madoushan for support of the Chinese 
army. Clearly, a force of 5000 warriors was a not 
large number to the Chinese army. However, 
Chinese historians mentioned these troops in the 
description of the military activities in the war of 
732 - 733. Probably, the Tang Empire had 
problems dealing with rider groups of the Bohai’s 
army and needed cavalry. 
But in 733, the Chinese Emperor sent word to 
the Bohai exile Da Menyi and asked him to help 
the army of the Tang Empire. The young brother of 
the Bohai ruler arrived at Madoushan Mountain (A. 
A. Kim 2011). As discussed above, the Chinese 
generals needed information about Bohai army 
from Da Menyi. Moreover, this Bohai exile knew 
both armies and could compare positions and 
specifics of the Bohai and Chinese military troops 
in this conflict. Probably it was helpful, because 
shortly after the arrival of Da Menyi the Bohai 
army retreated from Madoushan.   
The successful military activities of the Bohai 
forces demonstrate one important thing: Da Wuyi 
was completely prepared for war with China. The 
Bohai army and navy were mobilized before the 
war; Bohai diplomats had close contacts with the 
pirates. Therefore we can surmise that Bohai 
would have started a war whatever the case, but 
successes by the army of the Tang Empire were a 
good reason for a Bohai attack.  
The first victories of the Bohai forces in the 
war were unpleasant surprises for the Tang 
Emperor. The Chinese were quickly put in a 
difficult situation – in 732, the Tang Empire faced 
favorable conditions on its eastern frontier – 
Khitan and Xsi forces had been destroyed and the 
Chinese army was in a position to dominate. But 
after the Bohai attack, the situation was changed 
fundamentally – the Bohai navy destroyed 
Dengzhou and the Chinese fleet moored there. 
Furthermore, soldiers of the alliance of Bohai, Xsi 
and Khitan were located near the Great Wall of 
China and Tang armies could not defeat them. 
Moreover Turkic forces elected a new Khagan and 
this made the situation more dangerous for the 
Tang Empire – Turks could attack the Tang 
Empire from west, because Chinese armies fought 
in the east. 
At first, the Tang Emperor arrested Bohai’s 
advance and sent their ambassadors south (A. L. 
Ivliev, 2005, p. 456). The Tang Empire mobilized 
its forces, but Chinese officers understood that 
these forces would be insufficient to deal with the 
situation. Therefore the Tang Empire requested 
assistance from Silla and suggested a combined 
plan of attack on Bohai’s flanks (**Parhaesa 1996, 
p. 3; Giu Cheol Han, 1994; Si Hyeong Park 2000).  
Silla had antagonistic relations not only with 
Bohai at that time, but with Tang China too. 
Moreover, Silla had lost territories as a result of 
struggles with its northern neighbor. Therefore this 
Korean state needed to improve relations with the 
Tang Empire. Clearly, Silla sought to use this 
opportunity to take back lands from Bohai because 
Silla officers knew the military potential of China 
and understood that Bohai could not successfully 
fight against the Tang Empire – at least if Silla was 
also aiding Tang. 
As stated above, China needed an alliance 
with Silla too, probably, more than Silla needed the 
proposed alliance. Clearly, Tang could not obtain 
information about relations on the Korean 
Peninsula and a possible alliance between Bohai 
and Silla could be very dangerous for Tang Empire. 
Moreover, the Chinese army had problem with 
armies of the Khitan, Bohai, Mohe and Xsi. War 
on the southern border of Bohai would be helpful 
for the Tang Empire, because Da Wuyi would not 
be able to concentrate his forces in two distant 
areas at once. China also needed to finish the war 
rapidly because there was a risk that the Turkic 
Khaganate could attack the rear of the Tang 
Empire.  
Therefore China sent Kim Sarang to Silla. 
Kim Sarang was a member of the ruling dynastic 
family of Silla and hostile in the Tang Empire. His 
arrival was an important gesture to Silla. Silla’s 
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leaders understood the meaning of this gesture and 
contacts between both sides were established. So, 
in a difficult situation Tang’s army along with the 
Silla army built up an alliance consisting of several 
tribes (Shiwei, Heishui Mohe), thus forming a 
phalanx that could march against Bohai.  
We should note an interesting fact though: the 
Tang Empire gave the Silla king a new rank – 
commander for sea military activities (**Parhaesa 
1996, p. 102; ***Samguk sagi 1959, p. 219; Dyuk 
Gong Yu, 2000, p. 54). Thus Silla was compelled 
to provide safety in the sea and fight against the 
Bohai navy. This seemingly confirms what was 
stated above about the destructiveness of Bohai’s 
attack on Dengzhou; Tang was forced to bestow a 
naval rank on its ally, in order to get their naval 
military aid. 
Kim Sarang became the mediator that 
facilitated coordination of military activities by 
Silla and the Tang Empire against Bohai in this 
war. According to “Samguksagi”, Silla mobilized 
100,000 people for war against Bohai 
(***Samguksagi 1959, Nan Hee Ku 2011, p. 396) 
and sent armies to the north to support the Chinese 
army, which attacked Bohai separately from Silla.  
As stated above, however, Silla’s expedition 
proved to be unsuccessful – snowfall and bad 
mountain roads led to the destruction of the Silla 
army, more than half of the Silla soldiers were lost 
and the remainder was forced to retreat***.The 
Tang army fought with Bohai military troops, but 
could not win and was also forced to retreat**. 
In spite of the failure of the Silla expedition, 
his attempt to intervention greatly influenced the 
course of the war. Silla demonstrated the 
possibility of an anti-Bohai encirclement, a fact 
that surely did not escape the attention of Da Wuyi. 
Bohai’s position thus had changed. It forces now 
faced a war on three fronts – from the west (Tang 
Empire), the north (Shiwei and Heishui Mohe) and 
the south (Silla). Certainly, Bohai was prepared for 
a war on its western and northern frontiers, but the 
addition of a southern front was clearly too much 
for Da Wuyi. Moreover, Japan decided not to come 
to the assistance of Bohai. Bohai’s allies – the 
Khitan and Xsi – could not support Da Wuyi 
against Silla, because they were located in areas of 
modern-day Manchuria. The Silla expedition was 
therefore a tactical military defeat for its army, but 
more importantly constituted a strategic political 
victory which changed the course of the war.  
Nonetheless, Silla considered this expedition 
a failure and wanted revenge. Hence, Silla 
requested that the Tang Empire participate in a 
new joint strike. However, China had other plans, 
which we shall discuss below. 
Da Wuyi understood the complicated position 
he now faced and wanted peace with China.  
Things were complicated by his younger brother, 
however. At first, Da Menyi took up residence in 
the Tang Empire and sought to wage a political 
struggle against his older brother for control of 
Bohai. Moreover, China was interested in using 
him against Da Wuyi. 
Second, the course of this war confirmed Da 
Menyi’s initial judgment: Bohai ultimately was not 
in a position to fight and defeat the Tang Empire in 
a protracted military conflict.  Da Wuyi as ruler of 
Bohai could not be seen to recognize the opinion 
of his younger brother lest he lose standing in the 
eyes of both his subjects and in relations with allies 
and other neighboring states.  
In our opinion, this understanding of the 
situation was what drove Da Wuyi to send 
assassins to murder his younger brother Da Menyi. 
However, killers were arrested and executed by the 
Chinese (Dyuk-Gong Yu, 2000, p. 75). On the one 
hand, Da Menyi was acting as an advisor to the 
Tang army and knew much about Bohai’s forces. 
His murder of would therefore be helpful to both 
Da Wuyi and Bohai’s military. On the other hand, 
Da Wuyi also probably saw his brother as a 
potential pretender to the throne and therefore as a 
political threat. Russian scholar Alexander Ivliev 
believes that Da Wuyi wanted to the finish war 
with China and has described the war as being a 
proxy conflict between Da Menyi and Da Wuyi 
(****Gosudarstvo Bohaj, 1994; A. L. Ivliev, 2005). 
So, we can see a rather paradoxical situation – in 
spite of the fact that Da Menyi`s initial judgment 
about the dangerous of conflict with China being 
right, Da Wuyi sent assassins to murder his young 
brother in the Tang Empire. After this incident, the 
Bohai ambassadorial mission arrived in China to 
ask for peace and forgiveness (Ivliev 2005).  
At that time both sides wanted to peace. Not 
long time ago, the Khitan military had defeated 
Tang forces on the battlefield. The Turks had 
supported Khitan tribes in this military encounter. 
China saw this battle potentially the opening salvo 
of a long conflict with Khitan tribes and the Turkic 
Khaganate. Clearly, the Tang Empire needed peace 
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on it’s the eastern frontier – i.e. with Bohai. 
Moreover, peace with Bohai gave the possibility of 
support from Shiwei, Silla and Heishui Mohe in 
war with the Turks –allies can send military troops 
for Chinese side.  
Bohai too, as stated above, was in a 
complicated political and military position. In spite 
of victories in period of 732 - 733, Bohai could not 
support a long-term war with China and its ally 
Silla. Moreover, Bohai’s people did not support the 
young brother of the Bohai ruler against Da Wuyi 
and Tang leadership must have noted this fact. 
Therefore, the Chinese Empire quickly made peace 
with Bohai. 
There is however some debate among 
scholars over when the war actually ended. Usually, 
scholars from other countries consider 733 as the 
year when the conflict ended because this was 
when Bohai’s peace mission arrived in China. But 
Korean specialists believe that that the war 
finished in 735, this would mean that the war 
spanned four years.  
Historians from Korean peninsula believe that, 
in spite of the fact that Bohai’s ambassadorial 
mission arrived in the Tang Empire in 733, China 
was not able to stop its allies from continuing their 
operations against Bohai. China did not have 
speedy lines of communication with Shiwei, 
Heishui Mohe and Silla. Clearly, China’s allies 
wanted to benefits from this war, especially, Silla, 
which had lose a substantial part of its army. 
Korean scholars also have considered another fact 
– in 735, Tang Empire ceded land to Silla, (these 
lands were located in south of the Phaegang River 
and formally were under protectorate by China) 
(**Parhaesa 1996, p. 34, 103; Jin-Hun Jung. 1999, 
p. 49; V. M. Tihonov 2003, p. 213-214). These 
lands were probably a reward for Silla’s 
intervention in the conflict.  
As we can see, the peace between Bohai and 
China itself was declared in 733. But Tang 
“presented” land in Phaegang River to Silla in 735. 
Therefore it can be surmised that the decision by 
the Tang Empire was a subject for discussion 
among Chinese nobles.  
The Phaegang River has become the object of 
discussion between scholars, researching Bohai 
history. Some historians believe that Silla occupied 
these lands, but Tang Empire did not recognize 
Silla’s claim to this territory (**Parhaesa 1996, p. 
123). It seems though that Bohai had an interest in 
controlling this area. So, these lands became the 
object of conflict between Bohai and Silla. We do 
not know who lived in these lands at the time, but 
China ceding this territory to Silla clearly added to 
frictions present between Bohai and Silla. 
Certainly, Bohai could have controlled these lands, 
but was not able to fight against both China and its 
allies. Therefore it had to concede these lands to 
China, but the Tang Empire gave them to Silla. 
Bohai was to fight for control over these lands for 
a long time after this war. Silla sent expeditions to 
the Phaegang River throughout the 8th and 9th 
centuries (A. A. Kim, 2011a).  
Among historians there are a number of 
different opinions about the consequences of this 
war. Many Korean scholars believe that the war 
ended with a victory for Bohai. They have paid 
especial attention to the Dengzhou attack, the 
expedition of the Bohai army to Madoushan 
(**Parhaesa 1996; Si Hyeong Park, 1995, 2000), 
but have not written about the actual results of the 
war. Chinese specialists believed that Bohai was a 
Chinese provincial power (Hong Sung, 2001; Feng 
Yao, 2001) and these military activities were not 
war, only a rebellion against central imperial 
power. They consider that the conflict finished 
positively for China. Soviet scholars, under 
political pressures, supported the position of 
Korean historians (A. P. Okladnikov, 1959; A. P. 
Okladnikov, A. P. Derevinako, 1973).  
In the opinion of the authors, this military 
conflict was very much a war because Bohai was 
not a Chinese province or autonomous “region of 
Tang Empire”. Nonetheless, the war finished with 
the effective defeat of Bohai - it effectively had to 
cede lands to Silla, and its period of domination on 
the Korean peninsula ended. For a long time after, 
Bohai did not (and perhaps could not) mount 
military operations against either China or its allies. 
Bohai had interest in war against Silla as revenge 
for conflict 732 - 735, but looked for alliance with 
Japan for this and did not try fight against Silla 
alone (A. A. Kim, 2011b).  
It is important to remember however that the 
Tang Empire did not try to destroy the Bohai state. 
On the other hand, the Tang Empire did not 
consider the destruction of Bohai as in its vital 
strategic interest. Clearly, the Tang Empire needed 
to be careful on its eastern frontiers. China wanted 
to support Silla and to weaken Bohai. But Chinese 
officials remembered well that the destruction of 
87 
Alexander Alexeevich Kim 
Tome XVII, Numéro 1, 2015   
 
Koguryŏ by Silla and Tang forces led to Silla’s 
occupation of almost the entire Korean peninsula 
and the expulsion of Tang forces from the 
peninsula.  
Thus, Tang had fought a war against the two 
other states on the Korean peninsula – Paekche and 
Koguryŏ, but it was Silla, not China, that 
ultimately reaped the benefits.  
Clearly, Tang’s leadership carefully 
considered the aims of their war against Bohai and 
came to the conclusion that the destruction of the 
Bohai would merely allow Silla to occupy much of 
its lands – thus further strengthening Silla’s power 
in the region. Tang clearly did not see such an 
outcome as being in its geopolitical interest. Thus, 
when Silla asked China to attack Bohai again**, 
***, the Tang Empire probably considered this as 
being part of an attempt by Silla to seize Bohai 
lands, as it had done with Koguryŏ. When viewed 
in such a light it is not surprising that the Tang 
Empire did not accede to such requests.  Tang 
wanted to keep Bohai as a buffer, a counterbalance 
to Silla’s power on the Korean Peninsula. 
At the same time, however, Chinese officials 
sought to use Da Menyi against his brother. Such 
attempts though proved to be unsuccessful. In spite 
of Da Menyi’s assistance to Chinese army at 
Madoushan, his value proved to be limited. The 
Bohai people did not support him against his older 
brother, Da Wuyi, and China could not put him on 
the Bohai throne.  
So, as we can see, the victory of the Tang 
Empire and its allies in war with Bohai was not 
total. The reasons are not to be found in Bohai’s 
military strength, but distrust between Tang and its 
allies. 
  
Notes 
1. In the Soviet Union, scholars used the Chinese 
for identification of names in the Bohai (Parhae) 
state. Therefore, this article uses Chinese names 
for Bohai rulers. Russian specialists in Korean and 
Bohai studies began to use the name “Parhae” only 
from the 2000s. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Bohai rulers 
 
Da Zuorong (大??), 698 – 719. 
Da Wuyi (大??), 719 – 737. 
Da Jinmao (大??), 737 – 793. 
Da Yuanyi (大??), 793 – 794. 
Da Huayu (大??), 794 – 795. 
Da Sonlin (大??), 795 – 809. 
Da Yuanyu (大??), 809 – 812. 
Da Yanyi (大??), 812 – 817. 
Da Mingzhong (大??), 817 – 818. 
Da Renxiu (大??), 818 – 830. 
Da Yizhen (大??), 830 – 857. 
Da Qianhuang (大虔?), 857 – 872. 
Da Xuanxi (大??), 872 – 894. 
Da Weixie (大??), 894 – 907 (?). 
Da Yinzhuan (大諲?), 907 (?) – 926. 
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